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Herbert Marcuse’s Repudiation of Dialectics: 
From Reason and Revolution to 
One-Dimensional Thinking
MARCIAL GONZÁLEZ
ABSTRACT: Marxist dialectics continue to be relevant for both 
the study of society and political practice — a premise based on 
an analysis of selected works by Herbert Marcuse. In Reason and 
Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, published in 1941, 
Marcuse draws on Hegelian dialectics to defend Marxism, and he 
criticizes Marxists who have abandoned the dialectic and, conse-
quently, their revolutionary goals. By the 1960s, however, Marcuse 
himself had shifted from a Hegelian–Marxist standpoint to a New 
Left rejection of dialectics and class struggle. Even though his work 
was immensely popular during the 1960s among intellectuals, 
students and activists on the left, his anti-dialectical theories weak-
ened the analysis and contestation of capitalism during that time. 
His theories were also symptomatic of a larger trend among New 
Left intellectuals to abandon Marxism. This critique of Marcuse’s 
later works suggests that for our contemporary moment dialectical 
Marxism is more strategically viable than Marcuse’s 1960s theories 
of one-dimensionality and the techno-industrial society.
IN THE PREFACE TO THE 1960 edition of Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, originally published in 1941, Herbert Marcuse looks back two decades to explain that “this 
book was written in the hope that it would make a small contribution 
to the revival, not of Hegel, but of a mental faculty which is in danger 
of being obliterated: the power of negative thinking” (1960, vii).1 
1 The preface to the 1960 editionof Reason and Revolution, entitled “A Note on Dialectic,” was 
not included in earlier or later editions. It was, however, included in Arato and Gebhardt, 
1982, 444–51.
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He defines “negative thinking” as the “central category of dialectic” 
(1960, vii). I want to suggest that if Marcuse’s reasons for defending 
the dialectic were valid 75 years ago during a time of heightened 
global antagonisms brought about in conjunction with world war and 
fascism, they are just as valid today in an era marked by the absence 
of large-scale revolutionary movements, the constant threat of impe-
rialist war, the ever-looming peril of economic crisis, the rampant 
spread of racist, sexist, anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and neo-fascist 
ideologies, the fossil-fuel–driven devastation of the environment, and 
the arrogant claims of liberals and conservatives alike that Marxism 
and history itself have come to an end. Dialectical thinking — as the 
basis of social critique and revolutionary praxis — faces obliteration 
in a neoliberal capitalist world in crisis.
In the midst of such socioeconomic turmoil, we are entering 
a historical period in which political activism and resistance could 
come to match or surpass the political intensity of the 1960s, and 
the stakes today arguably could be greater than they were back then. 
Needless to say, there are lessons to be learned from the 1960s. Despite 
the many gains made by the antiracist, antiwar, antisexist, and anti-
establishment movements of that time, those movements did not lead 
to the transformation of capitalism — largely because of the persis-
tence and strength of capitalism as a system, but also because of the 
strategic mistakes made by activists and intellectuals on the left. Not 
only did those movements fail to change capitalism, but the social 
conditions for the working class and racial minorities worsened in 
the decades that followed with the rise of neoliberalism and globaliza-
tion, the deregulation of the corporate economy, the privatization of 
state services, the dismantling of the industrial base, the destruction 
of unions, the racist effects of a disastrous “war on drugs,” and the 
proliferation of the prison-industrial complex, not to mention the 
recurring economic crises and the various wars in the Middle East, 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. It is exceedingly important 
for activists and intellectuals on the left today to learn the lessons of 
what worked and did not work during the 1960s, and since, to avoid 
the costly mistakes of the past and aim for greater success in contest-
ing capitalism in the present and future. One of the key mistakes 
of the left during the 1960s, in my view, was the abandoning and 
discrediting of the basic principles of Marxism — especially dialecti-
cal materialism — in devising strategies of resistance. Marcuse is a 
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particularly important scholar to study in this regard because he offers 
examples of both a rigorous dialectical Marxism in his earlier years 
and a revised political theory that refutes Marxism in his later years. 
His turn away from Marxism marks a significant historical moment for 
Marxist studies because his work was enormously influential among 
students and activists during the 1960s, and it continues to enjoy a 
robust following among scholars today.2 Among critics who have taken 
a more decidedly Marxist approach in studying Marcuse, Paul Mattick 
and Rakesh Bhandari are especially incisive, the latter admitting that 
Marcuse’s “grip on the New Left is difficult for someone of my later 
generation to comprehend” (Bhandari, 1999–2000, 56), implying that 
a critical reassessment of Marcuse’s work today is especially important 
for young people. Recognizing Marcuse’s dialectical Marxism in his 
early years and criticizing his unfortunate turn away from dialectical 
thinking remain timely because the abandonment of dialectics out-
lined here has carried over into a good deal of the post-Marxism and 
cultural studies of our own time. Dialectical thinking is essential for 
anti-capitalist politics because it enables a critical understanding of 
class struggle and other contradictions of capitalism, such as the fall-
ing rate of profit, the crisis of overproduction, and the consequences 
of these developments.
In this essay, I will compare Reason and Revolution to a few of 
Marcuse’s later works to demonstrate the ways in which, in the 1930s, 
he embraced dialectics and then, in the 1960s, repudiated the clas-
sical Marxian form of dialectics in formulating his theories of one-
dimensionality, technological totalitarianism, and industrial society. 
I contend that during the course of his career Marcuse shifts from a 
Hegelian–Marxist theoretical standpoint to a rejection of dialectics 
and class struggle. This shift becomes evident in One-Dimensional Man 
(1964) and other works from that period. Interestingly, the early Mar-
cuse of Reason and Revolution  serves as a useful theoretical guide in 
forming a critique of the later Marcuse. My purpose for undertaking 
this study is to argue for the continuing relevance of dialectics in criti-
cal theory and political practice, and to suggest that Marcuse, as part of 
a broader New Left movement, played a significant role in attempting 
to undermine dialectical thinking and in laying the groundwork for 
2 Angela Davis, Douglas Kellner, Andrew Feenberg, Robert Pippin, John Abromeit, Heather 
Love, George Katsiaficas, Stanley Aronowitz, Kevin B. Anderson, and others have written 
sympathetically about Marcuse in recent years.
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culture-based political programs and other non-dialectical systems 
of thought.
Marcuse as Dialectician
In Reason and Revolution, Marcuse demonstrates an inspiring com-
mitment to Marxist dialectics in spite (but also because) of Marx’s 
affinity to Hegel. In this groundbreaking book, Marcuse analyzes the 
centrality of the dialectic in Hegel’s major works from 1800 to 1831.3 
In so doing, he demonstrates the ways in which Hegel’s dialectic influ-
enced Marx but simultaneously argues that the significance of the 
former can only be fully appreciated by comprehending Marxism’s 
dialectical sublation of Hegel. In a sense, Marcuse argues, Marx made 
Hegel’s dialectic relevant and coherent from a materialist standpoint 
by historicizing it. Marcuse also traces the influence of Hegel’s work on 
other 19th- and early 20th-century philosophers and social scientists, 
and he is especially critical of those, including some Marxists, who 
repudiated dialectics. “The history of Marxism,” he writes, “has con-
firmed the affinity between Hegel’s motives and the critical interest of 
the materialist dialectic as applied to society. The schools of Marxism 
that abandoned the revolutionary foundations of the Marxian theory 
were the same that outspokenly repudiated the Hegelian aspects of 
the Marxian theory, especially the dialectic” (1960, 398). What is most 
fascinating in this passage from Reason and Revolution, aside from its 
description of the relation between Hegel and Marx, is that Marcuse’s 
criticism of Marxists who “abandoned” their revolutionary goals by 
denouncing Hegelian dialectics, ironically, can be directed toward 
Marcuse himself in his later years.
In making his case for the revival of dialectics in Reason and Revolu-
tion, Marcuse discusses and analyzes the various categories of dialectics, 
clarifying, for example, that the category of “appearance and essence” 
might best be understood by examining the conflict between “existing 
reality” and its “negation.” He explains that for Hegel existing reality 
refers to the given facts, the empirical, or that which is obvious, while 
negation refers to existing reality’s potential for overcoming itself — or 
for undergoing a transformation into something new. It is important 
3 Fredric Jameson describes Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution as one of the “two major Marxian 
studies of Hegel.” The other study is Georg Lukács’s The Young Hegel. Jameson, 1981, 51 and 
51, n28.
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to note that existing reality cannot be fully or adequately understood 
in isolation from its negation (or inherent potential) because then it 
would remain incomplete or one-sided. The truth of an existing reality 
can only be fully appreciated by restoring the negative, a process that 
Hegel conceptualizes as “determinate negation” (Hegel, 1991, 147). 
Marcuse states that for Hegel “given facts that appear to common 
sense as the positive index of truth are in reality the negation of truth, 
so that truth can only be established by their destruction” (1960, 27). 
This is so because, even though “given facts” may appear to be true, 
they repress that part of their inner form (their potential) that makes 
them essentially true. To see the appearance of an object — physical 
or social — is to recognize only existing reality, but to understand the 
essence of an object is to comprehend the conflict between existing 
reality and its negation — between the object and its potential for 
transformation. Given its emphasis on negation and transformation, it 
is not difficult to understand why the dialectic is considered potentially 
revolutionary when mobilized for social critique. From a dialectical 
perspective, the working class represents the negation of capitalism 
and the potential for transforming capitalism into a new social form.
It would be deceptive to think of appearance as totally false or 
misleading. It will help rather to think of appearance as that which is 
“apparent” or easily recognizable. Appearance is “not mere seeming” 
(1960, 109) — it is not an illusion or a façade. It “is the expression of 
an essence that exists only as appearing” (1960, 109). That is, appear-
ance is the undeveloped stage (or moment) of the object’s essence; it 
is the arrested dialectic. Appearance represents partial truth, insofar 
as it reveals the outward qualities of an object; but it is also mislead-
ing because it does not represent the object’s negation. It fails to 
convey an understanding of the object as a thing in the process of 
transformation and presents it instead as a non-changing finished 
product. Thus, appearance offers a one-sided or static conception 
of the object. Likewise, the essence of an object cannot be equated 
exclusively with its negation (or potential for transformation); rather, 
essence must be equated with the contradiction between an existing 
reality and its negation. Contradiction “is not a distortion of a thing’s 
true essence, but its very essence itself” (1960, 148). Stated differently, 
“essence denotes the unity of being, its identity throughout change” 
(1960, 146). The essence of an object is constituted by its internal 
contradictions as they develop from one historical moment to the 
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next. Thus, the essence of an object changes over time because all 
objects are always in the process of constant change, which is to say 
that all things are rigorously historical and transformative.
As Marcuse explains, essence is not the same as negation, because 
negation represents only one side of contradiction — one side of the 
dialectic. Without a clear understanding of the principle of contradic-
tion, both negation and essence remain inconceivable. Furthermore, 
the act of coming to know the essence of an object reveals that what 
appears to be true often turns out to be the very opposite of truth when 
the negative is taken into account or restored, because the restoration 
of the negative is the fulfillment of an object’s “latent potentialities” 
and its “progress towards . . . truth” (1960, 123). By the same token, 
we could argue that any dialectical critique must begin by recogniz-
ing the gap between existing reality and its negation, between the 
factual and the potential. “The mark of dialectical thinking,” argues 
the early Marcuse, “is the ability to distinguish the essential from the 
apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation” (1960, 146). 
Common sense, or what Hegel sometimes refers to as “mathematical” 
thinking or cognition, (Hegel, 1977, 24–28) cannot grasp the essence 
of an object because it perceives objects exclusively in quantitative 
terms, or as if they are frozen in time at the moment of perception. 
As the early Marcuse states, “the task of breaking the hold of com-
mon sense belongs to . . . dialectical logic” (1960, 123). By contrast, 
“mathematical” thinking identifies a thing for what it is, as opposed 
to understanding it for what it is not  but has the potential to become 
(or is in the process of becoming).
Making use of these and other dialectical categories, Marcuse 
undertakes a critical study of the emergence of fascism in pre-war 
Europe. He asserts that Nazism did not emerge as a historical aberra-
tion, but as the logical development of bourgeois liberal democracy, 
and argues further that even though liberalism gives the appearance 
of expressing a hostility to all forms of totalitarianism, in essence it 
manifests a tendency to develop into full-blown fascism — a potential 
that in fact came to fruition while Marcuse was writing Reason and 
Revolution. Additionally, in “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the 
Totalitarian View of the State,” originally published in 1934, Marcuse 
points out that liberalism discloses this tendency with its utter disdain 
for Marxism coupled with its unconditional rejection of socialism. 
He explains, in a refutation of liberal sociologist Ludwig von Mises, 
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that “liberalism considers ‘capitalism the only possible order of social 
relations,’ and [that is] why it has only one enemy: Marxian socialism” 
(1968, 10). Marcuse’s analysis of liberalism’s tendency to evolve into 
fascism was not unlike the official position of the Comintern during 
the Third Period (1928 to 1934). The Comintern leaders argued that 
social democratic (or liberal reformist) parties were “social fascists” 
because they enabled finance capitalism’s drive toward fascism. R. 
Palme Dutt, for example, asserts that both “Social Democracy and 
Fascism” serve to maintain the rule of monopoly capitalism, but they 
do so in different ways. “Fascism shatters the class organizations of 
the workers from without, opposing their whole basis, and putting 
forward an alternative ‘national’ ideology. Social Democracy under-
mines the class organizations of the workers from within” the work-
ers’ organizations by taking advantage of workers’ antipathy toward 
capitalism (Dutt, 175). In a comprehensive study of Marcuse’s major 
works, Douglas Kellner explains that Marcuse and other members of 
the Frankfurt School, during the early years of the Institute for Social 
Research, “accepted the orthodox Marxian theory that fascism was 
a product of capitalist society [and] perceived the roots of fascism 
in . . . capitalist socio-economic crises that were given a totalitarian 
solution in order to protect the capitalist relations of production and 
to secure the continued control of the ruling class” (Kellner, 1984, 
95–96).
Substantiating Kellner’s assertion, Marcuse argues against the 
claim that Hegelianism leads to fascism, and this was one of his main 
purposes in writing Reason and Revolution. The accusation that Hege-
lianism inevitably leads to fascism was made during the early part of 
the century by neo-idealists and liberals who, motivated by their own 
ideological interests, too easily equated Hegel’s Absolute Spirit and 
political philosophy with totalitarianism and thus argued that fascism 
was a march toward the realization of Hegel’s “sovereign national 
state” (1960, 389).4 As Marcuse explains, “ever since the first World 
War, when the system of liberalism began to shape into the system of 
authoritarianism, a widespread opinion has blamed Hegelianism for 
the ideological preparation of the new system” (1960, 390). Need-
less to say, this charge against Hegel was equally — perhaps even 
4 Marcuse identifies L. B. Hobhouse, T. H. Green, and Bernard Bosanquet, as well as the 
Italian neo-idealists Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, among others, as examples of 
idealist philosophers who misread Hegel. See Marcuse, 1960, 389–401.
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primarily — an indictment against Marx and Lenin: the Bolsheviks 
at that time represented a greater threat to the status quo of capital-
ism than did an idealist philosopher who had been dead for almost a 
century. To counter this “widespread opinion,” Marcuse undertakes 
a study that illuminates the most revolutionary aspects of Hegel — at 
least of the “young” Hegel, up to The Science of Logic (1816) — who, 
in spite of his idealism, anticipates the logic and historical necessity 
of materialist dialectics. In a convincing manner, Marcuse interprets 
Hegel as a historically necessary precursor to Marx and thus practically 
makes of Hegel a Marxist-before-Marx.5 But if Marcuse overemphasizes 
Hegel’s proto-Marxist qualities in Reason and Revolution, he seems to 
do so consciously and with at least two political objectives in mind: 
to establish historical materialism as a genuine social theory; and to 
combat the ideologically-driven assumption that fascism develops out 
of Hegelianism. He accomplishes the latter by revealing that fascism 
develops as the logical consequence of the unresolvable political and 
economic contradictions of capitalism, which can be traced back to 
the increase in the organic composition of capital, the falling rate of 
profit, and the subsequent recurring crises of overproduction.6
Having relied on the critical capacity of dialectics to reveal the 
antagonism between Hegelian Marxism and bourgeois liberalism, 
Marcuse utilizes the same approach to expose the essential differences 
between Hegel and Marx themselves. On the one hand, he argues, as 
have others,7 that Hegel provided the necessary philosophical struc-
ture that enabled Marx to develop a social theory based on the mate-
rialist dialectic, proclaiming that given (what amounts to) Hegel’s 
critique of reification as outlined in the first three sections of the 
Phenomenology; given his “analysis of the labor process” as allegorized 
in the master–slave dialectic; and given also “the description of the 
5 Marx repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel. Referring to Hegel, for example, 
Marx considers himself “the pupil of that mighty thinker,” and he confesses that, in his work 
on the theory of value, he “coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him” (1976, 
103).
6 For a well-documented and compelling study that links the rise of fascism in pre–World War 
II Germany with the political and economic contradictions of liberal capitalism internation-
ally, see Sohn-Rethel, 1978.
7 In the 1967 “Preface to the New Edition” of Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 
Lukács updates his analysis of the relation between Hegel and Marx, and he self-critically 
characterizes his book, 45 years after its original publication in 1922, as “an attempt to out-
Hegel Hegel” (xxiii). Interestingly, this characterization might be applicable to Marcuse’s 
Reason and Revolution, as well.
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conflict between the particular and the common interest [and] the 
tension between state and society . . . we are driven almost of necessity 
to the critical theory that historical materialism developed” (1960, 
148). On the other hand, Marcuse does not fail to distinguish Hegel’s 
idealism from Marx’s materialism. More importantly, his distinction 
takes the form of a dialectical transition or sublation (Aufhebung ) 
characterized by the negation of philosophy and the emergence of 
a social theory:
The transition from Hegel to Marx is . . . a transition to an essentially dif-
ferent order of truth, not to be interpreted in terms of philosophy . . . All 
the philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic cat-
egories, [but] Hegel’s social and economic categories are all philosophical 
concepts. (1960, 258.)
We have emphasized that Marx’s dialectical conception of reality was origi-
nally motivated by the same datum as Hegel’s, namely, by the negative charac-
ter of reality (1960, 312). . . . We have said that for Marx, as well as for Hegel, 
the truth lies only in the negative totality. However, the totality in which 
the Marxian theory moves is other than that of Hegel’s philosophy. . . . For 
Hegel, the totality [is] the totality of reason, a closed ontological system, 
finally identical with the rational system of history. . . . The totality that the 
Marxian dialectic gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity that 
underlies its contradictions and shapes its every content is the negativity of 
class relations. (1960, 313–14.)
Marcuse explains that in one sense the Hegelian dialectic represents 
a historical truth in that it emerges as an expression of the “ratio-
nal system of history,” which is to say that the Hegelian dialectic as 
philosophy was historically necessitated by an emergent capitalist 
industrial society. The dialectic represented the consciousness and 
structure of history undergoing constant change and transforma-
tion brought about by the persistent sharpening and resolution of 
contradictions. In another sense, Hegelianism represents a falsehood 
in its limited consciousness of “the totality of class society.” The dia-
lectic with Hegel was trapped in a world of ideas and concepts rather 
than being engaged, as it was for Marx, with the material interests of 
social classes. On the one hand, the idealist dialectic was true because 
bourgeois society thrived on the dialectical negation of the system 
that it replaced; on the other hand, it was not true because capitalism 
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needed to obscure its own negation by repressing the transformative 
potential of class struggle. To understand Hegel as other than both 
true and not true is to deny the essence of the Hegelian dialectic as 
the conflict between a historically grounded idealism and a repressed 
dialectical materialism. Marx, in other words, did not simply replace 
Hegel, nor did he merely correct the faulty aspects of Hegel’s thinking; 
rather, he sharpened Hegelianism’s internal negation, theoretically 
and politically, pushing it toward its own opposite. Following Marx’s 
logic, Marcuse emphasizes the importance of internal contradiction 
by asserting that capitalism may appear to be a stable system, but it is 
at once a system in the process of decay, eaten alive from the inside, 
if you will, by its own internal contradictions and by the potential of a 
force that it must at all costs repress — namely, a revolutionary, anti-
capitalist class consciousness. Clearly then, for the early Marcuse, as 
for Marx before him, capitalism contains its own negation.
The dialectic, for the early Marcuse, is not an analytical method 
in the traditional sense; it is not a set of concepts that are used to 
analyze the object from a position external to the object. The dialec-
tic is based on and emerges from the essence of the object itself, or 
from the object’s internal contradictions. “The dialectical method,” 
Marcuse explains, “conforms to [the] structure that the philosophical 
object has” (1960, 100). Or in social terms,
capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through ex-
ploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advance in production through 
restriction of consumption. The very structure of capitalism is a dialectical 
one. (1960, 311–312.)
Even so, the dialectical structure of society is not absolute; it is histori-
cal. It will not necessarily operate under the same laws and categories 
forever but will change when society undergoes a qualitative transfor-
mation. The transition from a class society to a classless society, from 
capitalism to egalitarianism, will alter the fundamental structure of 
social relations, and thus it will alter the dialectic itself. Once this 
structural transformation occurs, the kinds of contradictions con-
fronted by society will be radically different. “For this reason, it is not 
permissible to impose the dialectical structure of pre-history [or class 
society] upon the future history of mankind” (1960, 317) in a class-
less society. “The communistic revolution,” Marcuse explains, citing 
G4655.indd   422 3/27/2018   11:50:31 AM
 MARCUSE’S REPUDIATION OF DIALECTICS 423
Marx, will not only “[do] away with labor” (1960, 292) but it will also 
radically transform the very forms of consciousness and existence.
The early Marcuse was committed to dialectical materialism — not 
as a philosophy, but as a social theory aimed at defeating fascism and 
bringing about a proletarian revolution to replace capitalism with a 
post-capitalist society. Unfortunately, Marcuse’s work after Reason and 
Revolution does not display an equivalent commitment to Marxism, 
nor does it maintain a comparable level of dialectical rigor. Somewhat 
paradoxically, perhaps, we can utilize the same dialectical approach 
used by the Marcuse of Reason and Revolution to formulate a critique 
of his later work. In so doing, we encounter a Marcuse who ultimately 
abandons a critical dialectic in favor of a spurious dialectic that ends 
up postulating non-dialectical ideas and practices.
Marcuse’s Repudiation of Dialectics
Thirty years after the publication of Reason and Revolution, Mar-
cuse’s theoretical and political stance has skewed in the opposite 
direction. He now argues that current political conditions demand a 
revision of Marxist dialectics. In a short article entitled “The Concept 
of Negation in the Dialectic,” published in 1971 and originally deliv-
ered as a paper in 1966, he explains his rationale behind a proposal to 
revise dialectics — a thesis he develops more fully in One-Dimensional 
Man and An Essay on Liberation.8 Marcuse asserts: “The present period 
seems to be characterized by a stalemate of the dialectic of negativity. 
We face new forms of late capitalism and thus also the task of devel-
oping revised dialectical concepts adequate to these forms” (1971, 
130). He draws on this basic premise to characterize class struggle 
and the concept of contradiction as “worn-out concepts” (1971, 132). 
Marcuse’s move away from what might be considered a Marxism 
influenced by the Third International was not unlike the decision of 
Western intellectuals (for example, the Historians Group of the Com-
munist Party of Great Britain) to abandon Marxism and Communism 
after 1956, prompted in large part by the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
8 In An Essay on Liberation, published five years after One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse walks back 
to some degree his rejection of “negative thinking” and “dialectics” in the earlier work, but 
he nevertheless still makes comments such as: “Technical progress has reached a stage in 
which reality no longer need be defined by the debilitating competition for social survival 
and advancement” (1969, 5). Unfortunately, the “technical progress” of which he speaks 
has not diminished the levels of exploitation for large sectors of the working class.
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Hungary and Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin 
that year (see Smith, 2016). Many of those Marxists who abandoned 
traditional Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s gravitated toward “New 
Left” politics, which in some cases eventually evolved into cultural 
studies. In other words, Marcuse’s trajectory was, for better or worse, 
depending on one’s ideological perspective, symptomatic of a larger 
historical trend rather than a personal decision to abandon a revolu-
tionary Marxist outlook.
In any case, to understand the significance of Marcuse’s proposed 
revisions, it will help to recall briefly the traditional Marxist under-
standing of revolutionary social change, as described by Marcuse him-
self in Reason and Revolution. For Marx, the transformation of society 
from capitalism to socialism results from the clash between capital 
and labor. Dialectically, the repressed negation (labor) of existing 
reality (capital) represents the concrete future, even if only as a pos-
sibility. When the negation overcomes its condition of repression by 
destroying existing reality, it takes the form of a new reality —  classless 
egalitarianism. The formation of this new reality requires that a work-
ing class that has fought tooth and nail to develop a consciousness 
of itself as the subject of history must now annihilate itself as a class 
on the road toward egalitarianism. To do otherwise would be self-
contradictory, since logically not even the proletariat can exist in a 
classless society.
The later Marcuse argues, however, that the concept of internal 
negation is no longer valid in the contemporary period for conceptual-
izing historical change. He explains that dialectical materialism con-
siders internal contradiction to be the motor force of change, but he 
asserts that advanced technological society has undergone such drastic 
changes that it can now only be “negated and superseded externally” 
(1971, 131). That is, social transformation, according to Marcuse, can 
no longer occur as the result of class struggle; it can only come about 
as the result of forces that stand “outside” the conflict between social 
classes. In opposition to the traditional Marxist conception of social 
change, Marcuse resorts to philosophical language to proclaim the 
futility of class struggle as a strategy for changing modern society: “it 
is always the being-in-itself which ultimately develops and rises to a 
higher historical level by negation” (1971, 130). Class struggle, in his 
view, strengthens rather than weakens the “being-in-itself,” by which 
he means capitalist society, or capital as subject. He criticizes both the 
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Marxian and the Hegelian dialectic for supposedly placing too much 
emphasis on internal contradiction and on the idea that “revolution-
ary transformation” will come about through “the development of an 
essence already existing in itself” (1971, 131), that is, that existing 
reality (capital) will be overcome by its internal negation (labor).
To support his proposed revision of Marxian dialectics, Marcuse 
looks to the work of Louis Althusser — an unlikely ally, given that 
each stood on opposite ends of the humanism–structuralism debate 
among Marxists during the 1960s and 1970s.9 Nevertheless, Marcuse 
reminds us of the wedge that Althusser drives between Hegel and 
Marx, emphasizing “Althusser’s efforts to redefine the connections 
between the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic” (1971, 130). He 
draws on Althusser’s argument that Marx’s materialist dialectic dif-
fers radically from Hegel’s idealist dialectic, and he points out that 
“according to Althusser, Marx actually broke with the Hegelian dialec-
tic” (1971, 130), insisting that Marxism not be considered a continu-
ation or logical mutation of Hegelianism, but, on the contrary, that 
it be understood as a completely different historical phenomenon 
— that is, as a discontinuity. Although he does not cite his source, 
Marcuse is obviously referring here to Althusser’s “Contradiction and 
Overdetermination.”10
The early Marcuse argued that the relation between Hegel 
and Marx must be understood dialectically as both continuity and 
 discontinuity — as the historical evolution of the dialectic, on the 
one hand, and as the rejection of idealism, on the other. But the later 
Marcuse supports Althusser’s argument that the Marxian dialectic 
must rid itself of any affiliation whatsoever with Hegel’s dialectic. 
Referring to Marx’s famous statement that with Hegel the dialectic is 
9 The humanism–structuralism debate marked a significant moment in the history of Marxist 
scholarship, but its full consequences lie beyond the scope of this essay.
10 Althusser’s essay “Contradiction and Overdetermination” first appeared in the French journal 
Le Penseé in 1962. A year later, also in Le Penseé, he published “On the Materialist Dialectic” 
in which he addresses two of the main criticisms levied against him for the claims he had 
made in “Contradiction and Overdetermination” about the differences between Hegelian 
and Marxist dialectics, and the meaning of these differences for a materialist conception of 
history. He identifies the two criticisms as follows: “(1) That I have stressed the discontinuity 
between Marx and Hegel . . . and (2) That by proposing the concept of ‘overdetermined 
contradiction,’ I have substituted a ‘pluralist’ conception of history for the Marxist ‘monist’ 
conception” (Althusser, 1969, 163). While Althusser disagrees with these criticisms and 
refutes them in his essay, he certainly understands the central theoretical and political is-
sues at stake in the Hegel–Marx debates that he inspired. The English translations of both 
articles were included in Althusser’s collection of essays For Marx in 1969.
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“standing on its head,” and that “it must be inverted, in order to dis-
cover the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (Marx, 1976, 103), 
Althusser writes: “It is inconceivable . . . that the Hegelian dialectic could 
cease to be Hegelian and become Marxist by a simple, miraculous ‘extraction’” 
(Althusser, 1969, 91, emphasis in original). In making this argument, 
Althusser attempts to free Marxism from what he considers to be the 
idealism inherently embedded within the very structure of Hegel’s 
dialectic, and he contends that it was not possible for Marx simply to 
invert Hegel or to remove the rational kernel from within the mysti-
cal shell of Hegel’s dialectic because the form of the dialectic itself is 
idealist. But with Althusser’s critique of Hegel’s dialectic, the Marxist 
dialectic suffers as well, while the theory of contradiction is replaced 
with the structuralism-inspired concept of “overdetermination.” The 
later Marcuse expresses agreement with Althusser’s argument that 
unless Marxism repudiates the Hegelian aspects of Marxian theory, 
it is condemned to idealism — or to philosophy rather than social 
theory. Marcuse, however, ups the ante. He does not merely agree with 
Althusser’s argument; he surpasses it, proclaiming that the Marxist 
dialectic itself is idealist:
I would submit an alternative to Althusser’s thesis: even the materialist dia-
lectic remains under the influence of the positivity of idealistic reason so 
long as it does not destroy the concept of progress whereby the future is 
always deeply rooted in the present; so long as the Marxian dialectic does not 
radicalize the concept of transition to a new historical level, i.e., the reversal, 
the break with the past and the present, the qualitative difference built into 
the theory’s tendency for progress. (1971, 130.)
Marcuse’s reference to “progress” here has less to do with formulating 
a critique of humanity’s march toward a higher level of civilization via 
a superior form of reason than it does with repudiating the dialectical 
conviction that “the future is always deeply rooted in the present,” and 
that all things possess the potential to “progress” from one qualitative 
state to another — to undergo a radical transformation into something 
new. Marcuse’s criticism of the concept of “progress” demonstrates 
the extent to which he has retreated from the dialectical premise 
that the working through of contradictions elevates the development 
of a social object to a new level — or, that the politicized struggles 
of the working class, or some other group of politicized oppressed 
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people, represent the future negation (and thus transformation) of 
capitalism. Needless to say, without the concept of a “future” which is 
“deeply rooted in the present” — or, what amounts to the same thing, 
a negation within an existing reality — the revolutionary potential of 
dialectics becomes effectively nil.
Nevertheless, for the later Marcuse, internal negation can no 
longer bring about change because capitalism has become a highly 
productive, totally administered society as a result of technological 
development, culminating in a culture of “abundance.” Thus, any 
possibility that workers will develop revolutionary consciousness has 
been deadened through higher wages and a more comfortable life-
style. For Marcuse, working-class struggles and class consciousness 
have integrated with capital to become part of the repression of the 
whole. The language of class revolution has become obsolete at best, 
and totalitarian and oppressive at worst. His criticism is also directed 
at Marxism, which defeats itself, according to Marcuse, by “belittling” 
what he refers to as “the power of facts (i.e., the mounting productivity 
of labor and the rising standard of living)”(1971, 131). Here Marcuse’s 
confidence in factuality does not sound like the Marcuse of Reason 
and Revolution, who points out that the “real field of knowledge is not 
the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of 
them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form” (1960, 145). 
Additionally, Marcuse’s reference to“abundance” and the “rising 
standard of living” does not apply to all people living in the United 
States equally.It certainly does not include the unemployed, underem-
ployed, homeless, incarcerated, undocumented and disenfranchised, 
and it does not apply equally to whites and people of color, men 
and women, straights and gays. Nor does it take into account the 
inevita-bility of recurring economic crises and their effects on the 
“standard of living” of the working class.11 
By contrast, the early Marcuse demonstrates how capitalism 
throughout most of its history has been fraught with crisis after eco-
nomic crisis: “Crisis and collapse are not accidents and external dis-
turbances, but manifest the very nature of things and hence provide 
the basis on which the essence of the existing social system can be 
understood” (1960, 148). For the early Marcuse, capitalism contin-
ues to exist under the same structural logic of perpetual crises and 
11 For a concise but sharp description of working-class resistance in the 1960s, see Smith, 2011.
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repressed contradictions, even though superficially it may seem to 
have undergone substantial transformations. But for the later Marcuse, 
change will not come from dialectical transformation or class struggle; 
it must come instead from forces “outside” the whole. He identifies 
two “outside” forces: the “state” and what will come to be known as 
the New Social Movements. Marcuse supports the intervention of 
“the state,” but by “state” he has in mind “a power outside the whole 
interest system.” Only such a power can “advocate the universal in 
this hopelessly antagonistic society” (1971, 131). Here Marcuse imag-
ines a state that stands disinterestedly outside the conflict between 
labor and capital. His concept of a disinterested state is a romantic 
conception, to say the least. More detrimentally, it eradicates the idea 
of a working-class subject as an agent of historical change. Marcuse 
argues also for a second “outside” force — a force not centered in a 
single class. This force represents a “chaotic, anarchistic . . . feeble, 
unorganized opposition,” but it “nonetheless rests on motives and 
purposes which stand in irreconcilable contradiction to the exist-
ing whole” (1971, 132). Marcuse alludes here to the kind of politics 
that would come to be associated with the New Left, the New Social 
Movements, the Free Love Movement that opposed the status quo 
through sexual liberation, and various kinds of counter-culture groups 
that followed anarchist strategies of opposition based on “dropping 
out”: “The refusal to join and play a part, the disgust at all prosperity, 
the compulsion to protest” (1971, 132). Today, Marcuse’s model 
of “liberation” may seem a bit dated, but the non-class-based 
forms of protest that he describes sound strikingly similar to some 
contemporary postmodernist models of cultural resistance, 
accentuating our urgent need to rethink what a form of resistance 
based on dialectical materialism would look like today.
Rather than argue for a critical dialectic that takes into account 
both internal and external factors, the later Marcuse proposes to turn 
away from the dialectic — to prioritize existing reality at the expense 
of its negation. At this point, Marcuse engages in a politics that refuses 
to participate in the social totality, rather than a politics that attempts 
to transform it. Thus, it comes as no surprise that, in the conclusion to 
One-Dimensional Man, he states: “On theoretical as well as empirical 
grounds, the dialectical concept pronounces its own hopelessness” 
(1964, 253).
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Technology and Capitalism
Marcuse’s turn away from the dialectic did not start in 1971 with “The 
Concept of Negation in the Dialectic” or in 1964 with One- Dimensional 
Man. It can be traced back at least to the 1954 “Supplemental Epilogue” 
in the second edition of Reason and Revolution, appearing a mere 13 
years after the book’s original publication. In marked contrast to the 
optimistic arguments about the dialectic in Reason and Revolution, the 
1954 epilogue begins to discuss some of the arguments that Marcuse 
acknowledges would be formulated more fully ten years later in One-
Dimensional Man.12 He states, for example, that “neither the Hegelian 
nor the Marxian idea of Reason have come closer to realization; nei-
ther the development of the Spirit nor that of the Revolution took the 
form envisaged by dialectical theory” (1954, 433). Notwithstanding the 
relatively brief period of time he allows for the realization of dialectical 
theory, considering the long, trajectory of human history, he argues that 
the revolution has not happened in large part because the “overflow 
of productivity” in capitalist society and the “rising standard of living” 
(1954, 436) for all social classes has stunted the workers’ revolutionary 
zeal. As a result, the working class has become an integrated component 
of capitalism itself, implying that workers as a class, to some degree, are 
part of the systemic problem rather than the solution. For Marcuse, 
workers have become a positive force that helps to solidify the system 
rather than a negation of the system. Paul Mattick explains:
According to Marcuse a working-class revolution can no longer be expected 
in industrially-advanced society. And even if it could be expected, control 
over the productive powers by “control from below” would, in his opinion, 
not lead to a qualitative social change. (Mattick, 1972, 99–100.)
Confirming Mattick’s observation, Marcuse states:
In the advanced industrial countries, since about the turn of the cen-
tury, the internal contradictions became subject to increasingly efficient 
12 Marcuse omitted the 1954 “Supplemental Epilogue” in subsequent editions of Reason and 
Revolution. In the preface to the 1960 edition, he explains his reason for the omission, stat-
ing that the epilogue “treated in a much too condensed form developments which I discuss 
more fully in my forthcoming book, a study of advanced industrial society” (Marcuse, 1960, 
xiv). He was, of course, referring to One-Dimensional Man.
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organization, and the negative force of the proletariat was increasingly 
whittled down. . . . The larger part of the laboring classes were made into a 
positive part of the established society. (1954, 436.)
In other words, new technologies not only enabled capitalism to 
increase its production, but it also satisfied many of the needs and 
wants of workers and improved their living conditions considerably. 
These developments thus removed the material basis or motivation 
for workers to fight back against capitalism, and they effectively sty-
mied the formation of any revolutionary consciousness before it 
could develop. In this way, “late industrial society . . . succeeded in 
controlling its own dialectic on the ground of its own productivity” 
(1954, 439). Consequently, the primary internal contradiction of soci-
ety ceased to be the struggle between capital and labor and became 
instead the conflict between a systematically administered society and 
the alienated individuals living in that society, regardless of class. “The 
sphere in which individual and group transcendence was possible,” 
Marcuse claims, “is thus being eliminated — and with it the life ele-
ment of opposition” (1954, 437).
Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School certainly 
made important contributions to the analysis of contemporary society 
with their critiques of techno-capitalist rationality and the extreme 
alienation (and totalitarianism) it produces. The potential drawback 
in the critique, however, at least in the case of Marcuse, was an argu-
ment that came dangerously close to considering technology rather 
than capitalism itself as the primary determinant of social conditions. 
Marcuse’s thinking about industrial society was influenced by Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, and this led him to 
formulate his own conception of technology in philosophico- 
ontological terms. For Heidegger, technology in a broad sense is 
not strictly something used by people, either to improve their lives 
or to make production more efficient; technology has also 
appropriated people and nature for its own use. That is, people 
don’t make technology; technology makes people. Technology has 
transformed everything in the world, not only humans, nature and 
history, but even God himself. For Heidegger, God has become 
technologized, and technology has become like a god — a process 
that culminates in what Heidegger refers to as a “world 
picture” (see Heidegger, 1993). Marcuse similarly thinks of 
technology  not simply  as  instruments  of  production  or  knowledge 
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but as a determining social force: technology is not neutral in the way 
that an inanimate object is neutral in the hands of its user; it has an 
agency of its own. It determines society and the relations of power. 
Technology, as a “productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to 
the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed occupa-
tions, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations” 
(1964, xv). Technology becomes integrated in the lives of individuals 
by developing its own political logic in the social world. “Technologi-
cal rationality has become political rationality” (1964, xvi). Marcuse 
acknowledges that “one may still insist that the machinery of the tech-
nological universe is ‘as such’ indifferent towards political ends.” But, 
he is quick to counter, “when technics becomes the universal form of 
material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a 
historical totality — a ‘world’” (1964, 154).
Marcuse’s conception of technology and the “world” it projects, 
like Heidegger’s “world picture,” differs from the traditional Marxist 
view of technology. Marx, for example, writes that “the self-valorization 
of capital by means of the machine is related directly to the number 
of workers whose conditions of existence have been destroyed by it” 
(1976, 557). For Marx, capitalists invest in technology to compete 
more effectively in the market place and to increase their profits, but 
such investments also result in the displacement of some workers and 
greater levels of exploitation for others. Technological innovation 
for capitalism also results in the increase of what Marx referred to 
as the “organic composition of capital” (1981, 245) or the value of 
materials, machinery, and technology relative to the value of the labor 
power required to produce a determined number of commodities. 
Such an increase conversely causes a decline in the rate of profit that 
reverberates throughout the entire capitalist system, and this means 
less profits for individual capitalists. Terrified of being driven out of 
business by competition, capitalists begin to produce more goods 
than can be sold profitably, and consequently the markets shrink as 
an economic crisis ensues. In response, the capitalists lay off workers, 
cut wages and benefits, or attempt to produce more commodities 
with fewer  workers — that is, they increase the levels of exploitation. 
“No matter how much the rate of exploitation [is] increased over 
time, this upward pressure on the organic composition of capital,” 
prompted by the need to invest constantly in technology and sci-
ence, “reduce[s] the average rate of profit in the system as a whole” 
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(Bhandari, 1999 –2000, 63). Under capitalism, technology and science 
are primarily instruments for class domination, despite the many 
cases where some new technologies have actually produced positive 
effects for human existence. “It would be possible,” Marx stipulates, 
“to write a whole history of the inventions made since 1830 for the 
sole purpose of providing capital with weapons against working-class 
revolt” (1976, 563). Similarly, in his Critique of Marcuse, Mattick draws 
on a traditional Marxist viewpoint to argue that it is the capitalist drive 
for profit, not technology, that determines the specific social relations 
under capitalism — and, by extension, the specific forms of alienation 
that individuals experience under capitalism. He writes:
It should be clear that the dynamics of capital production are not identical 
with technological development. It is not production and productivity as such 
which propel capitalism, but the production of profits as the accumulation 
of capital. (Mattick, 1972, 14.)
Beginning with the 1954 epilogue, Marcuse refers to society as 
“industrial civilization” or “industrial society” rather than capitalism 
because for him the internal contradictions that distinguish these 
formations have drastically changed. Under capitalism, the main 
contradiction takes the form of a struggle between social classes. 
Within industrial society, the main contradiction becomes the con-
flict between “man” and technological society. Thus, Marcuse argues 
not for class liberation, as he did in Reason and Revolution, but for the 
existential freedom of the alienated individual — that is, freedom 
from the technological totalitarianism of any social system, whether 
capitalist or socialist. The emergence of industrial society “made the 
classical forms of the social struggle old-fashioned and romantic. The 
barricade lost its revolutionary value just as the strike lost its revolution-
ary content” (1954, 438). In one clean sweep, Marcuse has disavowed 
the significance of the working class as a historical subject of change 
and reclassified contemporary society from “capitalism” to “industrial 
society.”
Marcuse’s revision of the dialectic continues in One-Dimensional 
Man, in which he asserts that in “advanced industrial society . . . the 
integration of the formerly negative and transcending social forces,” 
i.e., the working classes, “with the established system seems to cre-
ate a new social structure” (1964, 145). That social structure is a 
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one-dimensional industrial society--one-dimensional because it is 
now free of internal contradiction or class struggle. The increased 
efficiency and productivity of late industrial society resulting from 
technological progress has allowed for “the happy marriage of the 
positive and the negative” (1964, 227), by which he means the unity 
of capital and labor. Even though Marcuse refers to one-dimen-
sional society as repressive, manipulative and totalitarian — charac-
terizations that a large number of students and New Left radicals 
found appealing during the rebellious 1960s — the kind of oppres-
sion he theorizes at times seems more psychological and erotic 
than socioeconomic or historical. Marcuse’s assessment of capital-
ism as both totalitarian and liberating is grounded on the premise 
that class struggle has come to a standstill. “The closed operational 
universe of advanced industrial civilization,” he argues, “with its 
terrifying harmony of freedom and oppression . . . lead[s] to the 
triumph of the one-dimensional reality over all contradic-
tion” (1964, 124). Marcuse does not assert that the dialectic itself 
no longer exists; he claims instead that it exists only as a concep-
tual alternative that, in practice, is socially irrelevant because it has 
no subject. There is no class that can make use of the dialectic 
successfully. “Dialectical theory is not refuted,” he argues, “but it 
cannot offer the remedy” (1964, 253) because there is no contem-
porary practice (no class struggle) to which it corresponds. By now, it 
should be evident that the later Marcuse became the kind of 
“Marxist” he had criticized in Reason and Revolution, namely, Marx-
ists who had “outspokenly repudiated the Hegelian aspects of the 
Marxian theory, especially the dialectic” (1960, 398).
The Relations and the Forces of Production
It is instructive at this point to compare Marcuse’s rejection of the 
dialectic in his 1954 Supplementary Epilogue and One-Dimensional Man 
to Theodor Adorno’s arguments in an article entitled “Late Capital-
ism or Industrial Society?” The latter was originally delivered as the 
opening talk at the Sixteenth German Sociological Congress in 1968, 
a year before Adorno’s death. The talk was first published as an essay 
in the academic journal Diogenes, also in 1968, but was entitled “Is 
Marx Obsolete?” Even though Adorno does not refer to Marcuse by 
name, the article can be read as a general response to non-dialectical 
(and by implication, anti-Marxist) claims about industrial society. 
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Despite Adorno’s sharp Marxist critique in this article, it bears recall-
ing that “Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?” marks a radical de-
parture from much of Adorno’s earlier work, which conveys a clear 
and distinct pessimism, equal to that of Marcuse, about the possi-
bilities of overcoming mid-20th-century capitalism. Nevertheless, the 
essay offers a provocative set of ideas for challenging the skepticism in 
Marcuse’s work and perhaps in that of Adorno himself.
Adorno describes the purpose of his essay as follows: “What is at 
stake is whether the capitalist system still predominates . . . or whether 
the development of industry has rendered the concept of capitalism 
obsolete. . . . In other words . . . whether it is true that Marx is out of 
date” (Adorno, 2003, 111). As is the case in all of his work, Adorno 
does not offer a simplistic straightforward answer to a question but 
seeks a dialectical resolution to the problem. For example, in contrast 
to the later Marcuse’s assertion that “before the power of the given 
facts, the power of negative thinking stands condemned” (1960, xiv), 
Adorno argues for a mediation between the immediacy of facts and 
the universal laws of society, between empirical research and critical 
theory, and he cautions against the “fetishism” of either aspect. Dia-
lectical theory, in his view, must criticize “the illusion that individual 
and concrete facts determine the course of the world,” and simultane-
ously it must “not make itself at home in the medium of the universal” 
(113). Universal laws must be theorized as manifesting themselves in 
facts and must change accordingly when the facts change. Similarly, 
the factual must be understood in terms of the general laws of society; 
for Marxism, these include “the law of value, the law of accumulation, 
and the law of collapse [of capitalism]” (112, brackets in original).
Adorno also responds to the claim that because workers lack 
revolutionary consciousness the working class can no longer be con-
sidered a subject of historical change, explaining that working-class 
consciousness does not determine social class, but, quite the oppo-
site, the conditions of a social class create the potential for class con-
sciousness. His point echoes Marx’s declaration that “one cannot 
judge . . . a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the 
contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradic-
tions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social 
forces of production and the relations of production” (Marx, 1970, 
21). Acknowledging that revolutionary consciousness does not exist 
to any significant degree among the working classes of contemporary 
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advanced capitalist societies, Adorno argues that one cannot draw on 
this absence of consciousness to conclude that social classes do not 
exist. “Class [is] defined by the relation of its members to the means 
of production, not by their consciousness” (Adorno, 114). The failure 
on the part of workers to achieve revolutionary class consciousness is 
the logical outcome of capitalist accumulation and commodity fetish-
ism. “The impotence of the individual in the face of the totality is the 
drastic expression of the power of the exchange relation” (Adorno, 
120). From this perspective, the absence of revolutionary conscious-
ness among workers does not support the claim that capitalism no 
longer exists, or that workers and capitalists are now unified aspects 
of a non-contradictory social whole, but, on the contrary, it serves as 
further evidence that capitalism and its corresponding division of 
classes is more firmly entrenched in society than ever before, despite 
claims that technology, increased productivity, and large-scale plan-
ning have somehow rescued capitalism from itself. Even the early 
Marcuse himself argues that “the possibility of rational planning under 
capitalism does not . . . impair the validity of the fundamental laws 
that Marx discovered,” but, to the contrary, “the system is destined to 
perish by virtue of these laws” (1960, 318–319), if and when, we might 
add, workers and others take deliberate critically conscious actions to 
bring the system to an end.
Adorno’s primary dialectical intervention, however, in “Late Capi-
talism or Industrial Society?” is his critique of the categories “forces 
production” and “relations of production.”13 Adorno discusses these 
categories in order to theorize, as implied in the title of his essay, 
the difference between “industrial society” and “late capitalism” and 
as a way of understanding the present structure of society. He states 
firmly that the difference is not a problem of nomenclature, but a 
fundamental opposition between categories of analysis — an opposi-
tion that raises the political stakes significantly for scholarship and 
13 Not all scholars and activists have agreed on how to interpret Marx when considering the 
question of primacy in discussing the forces versus the relations of production. For an 
example of a “forces of production” primacy argument, see Cohen, 2000, who argues for 
“the productive forces over the production relations” and states that “the nature of a set of 
production relations is explained by the level of development of the productive forces embraced by it 
(to a far greater extent than vice versa)” (134, emphasis in original). For an example of a 
“relations of production” primacy argument, see Althusser and Goshgarian, 2013. Althusser 
argues that “within the specific unity of the Productive Forces and Relations of Production 
constituting a Mode of Production, the Relations of Production play the determining role, 
on the basis of, and within the objective limits set by, the existing Productive Forces” (1–2).
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activism alike. True to his dialectical commitments, however, Adorno 
warns that the “dialectician” should not
be forced into a clear-cut distinction between late capitalism and industrial 
society. . . . The task is to realize that the relation between these approaches 
expresses the contradiction that characterizes the present situation. (Adorno, 
2003, 114.)
Strictly speaking, we have as much to learn from the conflict between the 
two approaches as we do from either of them in isolation because it rep-
resents the inner form of society. “In terms of critical, dialectical theory,” 
and from a general perspective, Adorno argues, “contemporary society 
undoubtedly is an industrial society [in] its forces of production. . . . How-
ever, society is capitalist in its relations of production” (Adorno, 117). Or, 
another way of saying the same thing: contemporary society is marked 
by a contradiction between the forces of production and the relations 
of production — between technology and class struggle. However, from 
a dialectical perspective, and from his contemporaneous historical 
moment, one aspect of the contradiction is primary, and that aspect, 
in Adorno’s view, resides in the relations of production.
The signature of the age is the predominance of the relations of produc-
tion over the forces of production. . . . The fact that the extended arm of 
mankind can reach distant, empty planets but is incapable of establishing a 
permanent peace on earth makes visible the absurd goal toward which the 
social dialectic is moving. (Adorno, 2003, 119.)
The relations of production are marked by the fact that class power is 
firmly in the grasp of capital, which is propelling civilization toward catas-
trophe. Contrary to Marcuse’s claims, it is not the forces of  production 
— not technology — driving society toward absurdity, permanent war, 
and the seemingly never-ending colonization of the globe; it is the class 
relations and capital’s “concern for profit and domination” that have 
created this situation. “We should not blame technology, that is to say, 
the forces of production. . . . It is not technology that is the catastrophe 
but its imbrication with the social relations that embrace it” (ibid., 118). 
Unfortunately, “the idea that . . . the notion of society can be easily con-
structed solely by reference to the forces of production, is the current 
shape of socially necessary illusion” (124), which is to say that capital 
controls not only the forces of production but also, through various 
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social apparatuses, the production of ideologies that become “a real 
force” (120) and a social necessity that prevents people from being 
able to imagine an alternative world and a strategy for achieving that 
world. Despite Adorno’s general skepticism toward class struggle in 
most of his work, his adamant insistence on Marxist categories for the 
interpretation of society — along with his view that ideology possesses 
the potential to become its opposite, i.e., a “free spirit, which wishe[s] 
to do away with repression once and for all” (120) — appears (here 
in one of his final published works) more critically sustainable than 
Marcuse’s revisionist repudiation of the dialectic.
Conclusion
In Search for a Method, Jean-Paul Sartre addresses the general discon-
nect between bourgeois philosophy and material reality in declaring 
that the “condemnation of dialectic is aimed no longer at Hegel, but at 
Marx. It is no longer the refusal of Knowledge, but the refusal of praxis” 
(1968, 16). Similarly, almost three decades later, Jaime Concha asserts 
in the foreword to Neil Larsen’s Modernism and Hegemony: A Materialist 
Critique of Aesthetic Agencies that “now, as on other occasions, the struggle 
against Hegel is the oblique disqualification of Marx and of the historico-
practical fruits of Marx’s influence on the planet” (Larsen, 1990, xviii). 
Sartre and Concha, like others before and since, emphasize the continu-
ing relevance of dialectics for scholarship and activism committed to 
challenging capitalism and helping to bring it to an end. They are also 
critical of intellectuals on the left who have revised Marxism beyond any 
critical usefulness or have abandoned it entirely. Marcuse’s repudiation 
of the dialectic during the 1960s resulted in an unfortunate distancing 
of his work from Marxism and the forms of praxis it is capable of gen-
erating. For those of us interested in the possibilities of revolutionary 
praxis and social transformation in our current historical moment, there 
is much to learn from Marcuse’s shift away from dialectics. This shift 
represents more than simply a theoretical project gone awry — more 
than a story of an intellectual who renounced a set of beliefs he previ-
ously held; the shift, rather, is a manifestation of capitalism’s material 
need to negate the theoretical as well as the political implications of the 
dialectic, which in materialist terms means the negation of class struggle 
and class consciousness. I refer to Marcuse’s anti-dialectical theories of 
one-dimensionality and industrial society as “a material need” because 
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ideas do not operate exclusively as empty signifiers floating harmlessly 
in space but help to create the material conditions necessary for a social 
system to continue to reproduce itself (or to hinder that reproduction) 
with the least amount of static. Marcuse’s early work in Reason and Revo-
lution was enormously inspirational in its revival of the dialectic, only to 
be replaced by Marcuse’s negation of dialectics years later. Ironic as this 
may seem, the later work now expresses itself as the historical necessity 
to be reversed, or, as Marx himself might say, to be inverted — to be 
stood on its feet. The later Marcuse argues that in “a world in which the 
increasing comforts of life and the ubiquitous power of the productive 
apparatus” predominate, workers and other “forces of negation are 
either defeated or reconciled with the established system” (1960, xiv). 
But the truth of positivities such as technology, power, and capitalism 
can only be grasped when conceptualized in relation to the possibility 
of their negation. This essay has aimed to contribute in a small way to 
the revival of a critical theory and practice that Marcuse himself vigor-
ously and persuasively advocated in his early years but later attempted 
to obliterate: the power of dialectical thinking.
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